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Abstract We show the existence of involuntary unemployment without assuming wage
rigidity. We derive involuntary unemployment by considering utility maximization of con-
sumers and profit maximization of firms in an overlapping generations model under monop-
olistic competition with increasing or constant returns to scale technology and homothetic
preferences of consumers. Indivisibility of labor supply may be a ground for the existence
of involuntary unemployment. However, we show that under some conditions there exists
involuntary unemployment even when labor supply is divisible.
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1 Introduction
According to Otaki (2009) the definition of involuntary unemployment consists of two
elements.
1. The nominal wage rate is set above the nominal reservation wage rate.
2. The employment level and economic welfare never improve by lowering the nominal
wage rate.
Umada (1997) derived an upward-sloping labor demand curve from mark-up principle for
firms under increasing returns to scale technology, and argued that such an upward-sloping
labor demand curve leads to the existence of involuntary unemployment without wage
rigidity1. But his model of firms’ behavior is ad-hoc. In this paper we consider utility
maximization of consumers and profit maximization of firms in an overlapping generations
model undermonopolistic competition according toOtaki (2007), Otaki (2009), Otaki (2011)
and Otaki (2015) with increasing or constant returns to scale technology and homothetic
preferences of consumers, and show the existence of involuntary unemployment without
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assuming wage rigidity. In some other papers we have shown the existence of involuntary
unemployment under perfect or monopolistic competition when labor supply by individuals
is indivisible2.
Indivisibility of labor supply means that labor supply of each individual can be 1 or 0.
On the other hand, if labor supply is divisible, it is a variable in [0, 1]. As discussed by Otaki
(2015) (Theorem 2.3) and Otaki (2012), if labor supply is infinitely divisible, there exists
no unemployment. However, if labor supply by each individual is not so small, there may
exist involuntary unemployment even when labor supply is divisible. In this paper the first
element of Otaki’s two elements of involuntary unemployment should be
Labor supply of each individual is positive at the current real wage rate.
In the next section we analyze consumers’ utility maximization in an overlapping gen-
erations model with two periods. We consider labor supply by individuals as well as their
consumptions. In Section 3 we consider profit maximization of firms under monopolistic
competition. In Section 4 we show the existence of involuntary unemployment when labor
supply is divisible.
2 Consumers
We consider a two-period (young and old) overlapping generations model under monopo-
listic competition according to Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011 and 2015). There is one factor of
production, labor, and there is a continuum of goods indexed by 𝑧 ∈ [0, 1]. Each good is mo-
nopolistically produced by Firm 𝑧. Consumers are born at continuous density [0, 1] × [0, 1]
in each period. They supply 𝑙 units of labor when they are young (the first period), 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 1.
We use the following notations.
𝑐𝑖 (𝑧): consumption of good 𝑧 at period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑝𝑖 (𝑧): the price of good 𝑧 at period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑋 𝑖 =
{∫ 1
0
𝑐𝑖 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 𝑑𝑧
} 1
1− 1𝜂 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝜂 > 1.
𝑊 : nominal wage rate.
Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer.
𝑙: labor supply of an individual.
𝐿: employment of each firm and the total employment.
𝐿 𝑓 : population of labor or employment at the full-employment state.
𝑦(𝐿𝑙): labor productivity, which is increasing or constant with respect to
"employment × labor supply (𝐿𝑙)", 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) ≥ 1, 𝑦′ ≥ 0.
We define the elasticity of the labor productivity with respect to 𝐿𝑙 as follows.
𝜁 =
𝑦′
𝑦 (𝐿𝑙)
𝐿𝑙
.
We assume that 0 ≤ 𝜁 < 1 and it is constant. Increasing returns to scale means 𝜁 > 0.
𝜂 is (the inverse of) the degree of differentiation of the goods. At the limit when 𝜂 → +∞,
the goods are homogeneous. We assume(
1 −
1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁) < 1
2 Tanaka (2019a), Tanaka (2019b), Tanaka (2019c).
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so that the profits of firms are positive.
We assume that the utility function a consumer is homothetic. This means that his utility
function is a strictly monotonic transformation of a function which is homogeneous of degree
one. The utility of consumers of one generation over two periods is
𝑈 (𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑙) = 𝐹 (𝑢(𝑋1, 𝑋2)) − 𝐺 (𝑙).
𝐹 is a strictly increasing and differentiable function, thus 𝐹 ′ > 0. 𝑢(𝑋1, 𝑋2) is homogeneous
of degree one. 𝐺 (𝑙) is disutility of labor. It is continuous, strictly increasing, differentiable
and strictly convex, thus 𝐺 ′ > 0 and 𝐺 ′′ > 0.
The budget constraint is
∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)𝑐1 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧 +
∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)𝑐2 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = 𝑊𝑙 + Π.
𝑝2 (𝑧) is the expectation of the price of good 𝑧 at period 2. The Lagrange function is
L = 𝐹 (𝑢(𝑋1, 𝑋2)) − 𝐺 (𝑙) − 𝜆
(∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)𝑐1 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧 +
∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)𝑐2 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧 −𝑊𝑙 − Π
)
.
𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions are
𝐹 ′
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
(∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 𝑑𝑧
) 1𝜂
1− 1𝜂
𝑐1 (𝑧)
− 1
𝜂 = 𝜆𝑝1 (𝑧), (1)
and
𝐹 ′
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
(∫ 1
0
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 𝑑𝑧
) 1𝜂
1− 1𝜂
𝑐2 (𝑧)
− 1
𝜂 = 𝜆𝑝2 (𝑧). (2)
They are rewritten as
𝐹 ′
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
𝑋1
(∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 = 𝜆𝑝1 (𝑧)𝑐1 (𝑧), (3)
𝐹 ′
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
𝑋2
(∫ 1
0
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 = 𝜆𝑝2 (𝑧)𝑐2 (𝑧). (4)
Let
𝑃1 =
(∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)1−𝜂𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜂
, 𝑃2 =
(∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)1−𝜂𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜂
.
They are price indices. By some calculations we obtain (please see Appendix)
𝑢(𝑋1, 𝑋2) =
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
) [∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)𝑐1 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧 +
∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)𝑐2 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧
]
=
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
)
(𝑊𝑙 + Π), (5)
𝑃2
𝑃1
=
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
, (6)
𝑃1𝑋1 + 𝑃2𝑋2 = 𝑊𝑙 + Π. (7)
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The indirect utility of consumers is written as follows
𝑉 = 𝐹
(
𝑊𝑙 + Π
𝜑(𝑃1, 𝑃2)
)
− 𝐺 (𝑙). (8)
𝜑(𝑃1, 𝑃2) is a function of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2. It is positive, increasing in 𝑃1 and 𝑃2, and homogeneous
of degree one. Maximization of 𝑉 with respect to 𝑙 implies
𝐹 ′𝑊 = 𝜑(𝑃1, 𝑃2)𝐺 ′(𝑙). (9)
Let 𝜌 = 𝑃
2
𝑃1
. From (9)
𝐹 ′𝜔 = 𝐹 ′
𝑊
𝑃1
= 𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′(𝑙). (10)
𝜔 is the real wage rate. 𝐹 ′ is a function of 𝑊𝑙+Π
𝜑 (𝑃1 ,𝑃2)
such that
𝐹 ′ = 𝐹 ′
(
𝑊𝑙 + Π
𝜑(𝑃1, 𝑃2)
)
= 𝐹 ′
(
𝜔𝑙 + 𝜋
𝜑(1, 𝜌)
)
,
where
𝜋 =
Π
𝑃1
.
If the value of 𝜌 is given, 𝑙 is obtained from (10) as a function of 𝜔.
From (10)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
=
𝐹 ′ + 𝐹 ′′ 𝜔𝑙
𝜑 (1,𝜌)
𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′′ − 𝐹 ′′ 𝜔
2
𝜑 (1,𝜌)
.
We assume
𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′′ − 𝐹 ′′
𝜔2
𝜑(1, 𝜌)
> 0,
and
𝐹 ′ + 𝐹 ′′
𝜔𝑙
𝜑(1, 𝜌)
> 0.
Then, 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
> 0, and labor supply 𝑙 is increasing in the real wage rate 𝜔. If 𝐹 (𝑢(𝑋1, 𝑋2)) is
homogeneous of degree one, 𝐹 ′ = 1 and 𝐹 ′′ = 0.
For an unemployed individual the indirect utility is
𝐹
(
Π
𝜑(𝑃1, 𝑃2)
)
.
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3 Firms
Let
𝛼 =
𝑃1𝑋1
𝑃1𝑋1 + 𝑃2𝑋2
=
𝑋1
𝑋1 + 𝜌𝑋2
, 0 < 𝛼 < 1.
From (3) ∼ (7),
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π)
(∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1
𝑐1 (𝑧)
− 1
𝜂 = 𝑝1 (𝑧).
Since
𝑋1 =
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π)
𝑃1
,
we have (
𝑋1
) 1
𝜂
−1
=
(∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1
𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1
=
(
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π)
𝑃1
) 1
𝜂
−1
.
Therefore,
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π)
(
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π)
𝑃1
) 1
𝜂
−1
𝑐1 (𝑧)
− 1
𝜂 =
(
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π)
𝑃1
) 1
𝜂
𝑃1𝑐1 (𝑧)
− 1
𝜂 = 𝑝1 (𝑧).
Thus,
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1
𝜂 =
(
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π)
𝑃1
) 1
𝜂
𝑃1
(
𝑝1 (𝑧)
)−1
.
Hence,
𝑐1 (𝑧) =
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π)
𝑃1
(
𝑝1 (𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜂
.
This is demand for good 𝑧 of an individual of younger generation. Similarly, his demand for
good 𝑧 in the second period is
𝑐2 (𝑧) =
(1 − 𝛼) (𝑊𝑙 + Π)
𝑃2
(
𝑝2 (𝑧)
𝑃2
)−𝜂
.
Let 𝑐2 (𝑧), 𝑙, be demand for good 𝑧 and labor supply of an older generation consumer, ?¯? and
Π¯ be the nominal wage rate and the profit in his first period. Then
𝑐2 (𝑧) =
(1 − 𝛼) (?¯?𝑙 + Π¯)
𝑃1
(
𝑝1 (𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜂
.
(1 − 𝛼)(?¯?𝑙 + Π¯) is his saving carried over from his first period. Let 𝑀 be the saving. Then,
his demand for good 𝑧 is
𝑀
𝑃1
(
𝑝1 (𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜂
.
The government expenditure constitutes the national income as well as consumptions of
younger and older generations. The total demand for good 𝑧 is written as
𝑐(𝑧) =
𝑌
𝑃1
(
𝑝1 (𝑧)
𝑃1
)−𝜂
.
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𝑌 is the effective demand defined by
𝑌 = 𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙 + Π) + 𝐺 + 𝑀.
𝐺 is the government expenditure (about this demand function please see Otaki (2007), Otaki
(2009)). The total employment, the total profits, the total government expenditure and the
total consumption by the older generation are
∫ 1
0
𝐿𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿,
∫ 1
0
Π𝑑𝑧 = Π,
∫ 1
0
𝐺𝑑𝑧 = 𝐺,
∫ 1
0
𝑀𝑑𝑧 = 𝑀.
We have
𝜕𝑐(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1 (𝑧)
= −𝜂
𝑌
𝑃1
𝑝1 (𝑧)−1−𝜂(
𝑃1
)−𝜂 = −𝜂 𝑐(𝑧)
𝑝1 (𝑧)
.
From 𝑐(𝑧) = 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙),
𝜕 (𝐿𝑙)
𝜕𝑝1 (𝑧)
=
1
𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′
𝜕𝑐(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1 (𝑧)
.
The profit of Firm 𝑧 is
𝜋(𝑧) = 𝑝1 (𝑧)𝑐(𝑧) −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑐(𝑧).
𝑃1 is given for Firm 𝑧. 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) is the productivity of labor, which is increasing with respect to
𝐿𝑙.
The elasticity of the labor productivity with respect to 𝐿𝑙 is
𝜁 =
𝑦′
𝑦 (𝐿𝑙)
𝐿𝑙
.
The condition for profit maximization with respect to 𝑝1 (𝑧) is
𝑐(𝑧) +
[
𝑝1 (𝑧) −
𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑐(𝑧)𝑦′ 1
𝑦 (𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)2
𝑊
]
𝜕𝑐(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1 (𝑧)
=𝑐(𝑧) +
[
𝑝1 (𝑧) −
1 − 𝐿𝑙𝑦′ 1
𝑦 (𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊
]
𝜕𝑐(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1 (𝑧)
=𝑐(𝑧) +
[
𝑝1 (𝑧) −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′
]
𝜕𝑐(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1 (𝑧)
= 0.
From this
𝑝1 (𝑧) =
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′
−
𝑐(𝑧)
𝜕𝑐 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝1 (𝑧)
=
𝑊
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
+
1
𝜂
𝑝1 (𝑧).
Therefore, we obtain
𝑝1 (𝑧) =
𝑊(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
.
With increasing returns to scale, since 𝜁 > 0, 𝑝1 (𝑧) is lower than that in a case of constant
returns to scale given the value of𝑊 .
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4 Involuntary unemployment
Since the model is symmetric, the prices of all goods are equal. Then,
𝑃1 = 𝑝1 (𝑧).
Hence
𝑃1 =
𝑊(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
.
The real wage rate is
𝜔 =
𝑊
𝑃1
=
(
1 −
1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙). (11)
It is determined by firms’ behavior. Under increasing (constant) returns to scale, since 𝜁 is
constant, 𝜔 is increasing (constant) with respect to 𝐿𝑙. From (10) and (11) we get
𝐹 ′
(
1 −
1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′(𝑙). (12)
From (12) labor supply of an individual is obtained as a function of 𝐿. Denote it by 𝑙 (𝐿).
We assume
𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′′(𝑙) − 𝐹 ′
(
1 −
1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦′𝐿 − 𝐹 ′′
(
1 −
1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝜔
𝜑(1, 𝜌)
> 0. (13)
This means
𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′′(𝑙) − 𝐹 ′′
(
1 −
1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝜔
𝜑(1, 𝜌)
> 0. (14)
(13) and (14) guarantee that 𝑙 (𝐿) is increasing and 𝐿𝑙 (𝐿) is strictly increasing with respect
to 𝐿 because
𝑑𝑙 (𝐿)
𝑑𝐿
=
𝐹 ′
(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦′𝑙 (𝐿)
𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′′(𝑙) − 𝐹 ′
(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦′𝐿 − 𝐹 ′′
(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙) 𝜔
𝜑 (1,𝜌)
≥ 0,
and
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙 (𝐿))
𝑑𝐿
= 𝑙 (𝐿)+𝐿
𝑑𝑙 (𝐿)
𝑑𝐿
=
[
𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′′(𝑙) − 𝐹 ′′
(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙) 𝜔
𝜑 (1,𝜌)
]
𝑙 (𝐿)
𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′′(𝑙) − 𝐹 ′
(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦′𝐿 − 𝐹 ′′
(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙) 𝜔
𝜑 (1,𝜌)
> 0.
Then, the real wage rate 𝜔 is increasing in 𝐿 because 𝑦′ ≥ 0.
Alternatively, from (12) 𝑙 is obtained as a function of 𝐿𝑙. Denote it by 𝑙 (𝐿𝑙). Then,
𝑑𝑙 (𝐿𝑙)
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
=
𝐹 ′
(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦′
𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′′ − 𝐹 ′′
(
1 − 1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙) 𝜔
𝜑 (1,𝜌)
≥ 0.
The aggregate supply of the good is equal to
𝑊𝐿𝑙 + Π = 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙).
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𝐿𝑙 is an abbreviation of 𝐿𝑙 (𝐿) or 𝐿𝑙 (𝐿𝑙). The aggregate demand is
𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙 + Π) + 𝐺 + 𝑀 = 𝛼𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐺 + 𝑀.
Since they are equal,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐺 + 𝑀,
or
𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
𝐺 + 𝑀
1 − 𝛼
.
In real terms3
𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
1
1 − 𝛼
(𝑔 + 𝑚) , (15)
or
𝐿𝑙 =
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
(𝑔 + 𝑚) ,
where
𝑔 =
𝐺
𝑃1
, 𝑚 =
𝑀
𝑃1
.
(15) means that "employment × labor supply" 𝐿𝑙 is determined by 𝑔 +𝑚. 𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) is strictly
increasing in 𝐿𝑙 because
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙))
𝑑 (𝐿𝑙)
= 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙𝑦′ = 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
(
1 +
𝐿𝑙𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
)
= 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)(1 + 𝜁) > 0.
Therefore, there exists the unique value of 𝐿𝑙 which satisfies (15) given 𝑔 + 𝑚. It is strictly
increasing in 𝑔 +𝑚. From (12) we obtain the value of 𝑙 (𝐿𝑙), and the value of 𝐿 is determined
by 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑙
𝑙 (𝐿𝑙)
. 𝐿𝑙 can not be larger than 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 ). However, it may be strictly smaller than
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 ). Then, there exists involuntary umemployment, that is, 𝐿 < 𝐿 𝑓 because 𝐿𝑙 is
strictly increasing in 𝐿.
If we consider the following budget constraint for the government with a lump-sum tax
T on the younger generation consumers,
𝐺 = 𝑇,
the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply are
𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙 + Π − 𝐺) + 𝐺 + 𝑀 = 𝛼(𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐺) + 𝐺 + 𝑀 = 𝑃1𝐿𝑙𝑦(𝐿𝑙).
Then, we get4
𝐿𝑙 =
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
[(1 − 𝛼)𝑔 + 𝑚],
If labor supply of each individual is small, there exists no unemployment. If it is not so
small, however, it is likely that there exists involuntary unemployment without sufficiently
large value of 𝑔 + 𝑚.
If
𝐹 ′
(
1 −
1
𝜂
)
(1 + 𝜁) 𝑦 (𝐿𝑙) > 𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′ (𝑙) for any 0 <𝑙 < 1, given 𝐿,
individuals choose 𝑙 = 1, and then the labor supply is indivisible.
On the other hand, if
𝐹 ′
(
1 −
1
𝜂
)
lim
𝐿𝑙→0
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿𝑙) <𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺 ′(0),
individuals choose 𝑙 = 0. However, if 𝐺 ′(0) is sufficiently small, 𝑙> 0.
3
1
1−𝛼 is a multiplier.
4 This equation means that the balanced budget multiplier is 1.
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Summary of discussions
1. The real aggregate demand and "employment × labor supply" (𝐿𝑙) are determined by
the value of 𝑔 + 𝑚 according to (15).
2. Labor supply of each individual is determined by 𝐿𝑙 according to (12).
3. The employment 𝐿 is determined by
𝐿 =
𝐿𝑙
𝑙 (𝐿𝑙)
.
The employmentmay be smaller than the population of labor, then there exists involuntary
unemployment.
4. The real wage rate is determined by 𝐿𝑙 according to (11).
There exists no mechanism to reduce involuntary unemployment unless 𝑔 + 𝑚 is increased.
Comment on the nominal wage rate The reduction of the nominal wage rate induces a
proportionate reduction of the price even when there exists involuntary unemployment, and
it does not rescue involuntary unemployment (please see Chapter 2 of Otaki (2016)5.
In the model of this section no mechanism determines the nominal wage rate. When the
nominal value of 𝐺 + 𝑀 increases, the nominal aggregate demand and supply increase. If
the nominal wage rate rises, the price also rises. If the rate of an increase in the nominal
wage rate is smaller than the rate of an increase in 𝐺 + 𝑀 , the real aggregate supply and
the employment increase. Partition of the effects by an increase in 𝐺 + 𝑀 into a rise in the
nominal wage rate (and the price) and an increase in the employment may be determined by
bargaining between labor and firm6.
Full-employment case If 𝐿 = 𝐿 𝑓 , full-employment is realized. Then, (15) is written as
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 )𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 )) =
1
1 − 𝛼
(𝑔 + 𝑚). (16)
𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 ) is obtained from
(1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙) = 𝜑(1, 𝜌)𝐺
′(𝑙).
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 ) > 𝐿𝑙 (𝐿) for any 𝐿 < 𝐿 𝑓 because 𝐿𝑙 (𝐿) is strictly increasing in 𝐿. Since 𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 )
is constant, (16) is an identity not an equation. On the other hand, (15) is an equation not an
identity. (16) should be written as
𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 )𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 )) ≡
1
1 − 𝛼
(𝑔 + 𝑚). (17)
This defines the value of 𝑔 + 𝑚 which realizes the full-employment state.
From (17) we have
𝑃1 =
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 )𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 ))
(𝐺 + 𝑀),
where
𝑔 =
𝐺
𝑃1
, 𝑚 =
𝑀
𝑃1
.
5 However, there is room for improvement of employment if the nominal values of government expenditure
and consumption by older generation are maintained when the nominal wage rate is reduced.
6 Otaki (2009) has shown the existence of involuntary unemployment using efficient wage bargaining
according toMcDonald and Solow (1981). The arguments of this paper, however, do not depend on bargaining.
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Therefore, the price level 𝑃1 is determined by 𝐺 +𝑀 , which is the sum of nominal values of
government expenditure and consumption by older generation. Also the nominal wage rate
is determined by
𝑊 = (1 + 𝜁)𝑦(𝐿 𝑓 𝑙 (𝐿 𝑓 ))𝑃
1.
Steady state At the steady state 𝜌 = 1. If 𝑔 + 𝑚 is constant, the employment is constant.
5 Concluding Remark
In this paper we have examined the existence of involuntary umemployment using a mo-
nopolistic competition model with increasing or constant returns to scale technology and
homothetic preferences of consumers. It is a limited assumption that the goods are produced
by only labor. The analysis of a case where the goods are produced by capital and labor is
one of themes of future researches.
Appendix: Derivations of (5), (6), (7) and (8)
From (3) and (4)
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
𝑋1
(∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1 ∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧 =
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
𝑋1 =
𝜆
𝐹 ′
∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)𝑐1 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧,
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
𝑋2
(∫ 1
0
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1 ∫ 1
0
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧 =
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
𝑋2 =
𝜆
𝐹 ′
∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)𝑐2 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧.
Since 𝑢 (𝑋1, 𝑋2) is homogeneous of degree one,
𝑢 (𝑋1, 𝑋2) =
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
𝑋1 +
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
𝑋2.
Thus, we obtain ∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)𝑐1 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)𝑐2 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧
=
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
𝑋1
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
𝑋2
,
and
𝑢 (𝑋1, 𝑋2) =
𝜆
𝐹 ′
[∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)𝑐1 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧 +
∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)𝑐2 (𝑧)𝑑𝑧
]
=
𝜆
𝐹 ′
(𝑊𝑙 + Π) . (5)
From (1) and (2), we have
(
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
)1−𝜂 (∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 =
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
)1−𝜂
𝑝1 (𝑧)1−𝜂 ,
and (
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
)1−𝜂 (∫ 1
0
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 =
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
)1−𝜂
𝑝2 (𝑧)1−𝜂 .
They mean
(
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
)1−𝜂 (∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1 ∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧 =
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
)1−𝜂 ∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)1−𝜂𝑑𝑧,
and (
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
)1−𝜂 (∫ 1
0
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧
)−1 ∫ 1
0
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧 =
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
)1−𝜂 ∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)1−𝜂𝑑𝑧.
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Note that
𝐹 ′ = 𝐹 ′ (𝑢 (𝑋1, 𝑋2)) ,
and
𝑋1 =
{∫ 1
0
𝑐1 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧
} 1
1− 1𝜂 , 𝑋2 =
{∫ 1
0
𝑐2 (𝑧)
1− 1𝜂 𝑑𝑧
} 1
1− 1𝜂 .
Then, we obtain
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
=
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
) (∫ 1
0
𝑝1 (𝑧)1−𝜂𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜂
=
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
)
𝑃1,
and
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
=
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
) (∫ 1
0
𝑝2 (𝑧)1−𝜂𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜂
=
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
)
𝑃2.
From them we get
𝑢 (𝑋1, 𝑋2) =
(
𝜆
𝐹 ′
)
(𝑃1𝑋1 + 𝑃2𝑋2) ,
𝑃2
𝑃1
=
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋2
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋1
, (6)
and
𝑃1𝑋1 + 𝑃2𝑋2 =𝑊𝑙 + Π. (7)
Since 𝑢 (𝑋1, 𝑋2) is homogeneous of degree one, 𝜆
𝐹′
is a function of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2, and 𝐹
′
𝜆 is homogeneous of
degree one because proportional increases in 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 reduce 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 at the same rate given𝑊𝑙 + Π.
We obtain the following indirect utility function.
𝑉 = 𝐹
(
𝑊𝑙 + Π
𝜑 (𝑃1, 𝑃2)
)
−𝐺 (𝑙) . (8)
𝜑 (𝑃1, 𝑃2) is a function which is homogenous of degree one.
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